On this issue (but take a look at the previous post) it is interesting to remark what Medard Boss reports about Heidegger’s critique of psychoanalysis, since it is not always noted. Heidegger says: “Psychoanalysis glimpses from Dasein only the mode of fallenness and its urge. It posits this constitution as authentically human and objectifies [the human being] with his ‘drives'” (174). In other words, Heidegger’s contention is that the basic psychoanalytic framework posits an urge, as some kind of bad property of the subject, that makes the subject act out in painful ways. For Heidegger it is essential to invert the interpretative structure, so that the essential characteristics of being-in-the-world are taken in, and particularly the three ecstases of temporality: not just being-alongside or being-at (Sein-bei), not just Immer-schon-sein as always-already-being, but also being-ahead-of-oneself (sich-vorweg-sein). I note this critique of psychoanalysis but abstain from opining on whether it is fair for all analysts, or whether psychoanalysis has already worked this out. My interest refers to infrapolitics, which is a thinking of the always-already to the extent that it is very much a thinking of the ontico-ontological difference. I suppose, but then I also suppose this supposition is very much a question, that what is “infra-” about infrapolitics is very directly and strongly connected to the always-already structure. It is nevertheless an essential aspect of the existential analytic that there is no real relation to the always-already that is not at the same time involving the present from a radical consideration of the to-come. The three temporalizing ecstases are equiprimordial . So this is the question: if the three emphases are equiprimordial, can it be claimed that a privileged relationship to the always-already, to the particular kind of always-already that both the ontological difference and psychoanalysis must claim for themselves even if in different ways, should be given leeway?